

OPERATIONS IN THE HOMELAND

A Concept of Army Employment

Summary of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-07 (DRAFT)

Background

The United States of America is leading an international war to defeat global terrorism and the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) have prompted our national leaders to set new priorities in this effort. Winning this war, while defending the homeland, is now a top priority for our nation's military, to include its Army. The Army has not been directed to take such an active role in securing the homeland since World War II. Since 9/11, the Armed Forces have a priority mission to prevent, protect against, and respond to threats and disasters in the homeland. These include attacks by terrorists. The Armed Forces, especially the Army, must also continue to support civil authorities for a myriad of other significant dangers and hazards.

The concept of Homeland Operations includes traditional and pre-9/11 requirements such as the Stafford Act, Department of Defense Directives (DODD), the Federal Response Plan (FRP), governmental and combatant command plans, and Army doctrine. These combine with new and emerging challenges such as those found in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, *Defense Planning Guidance*, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, and *Army Strategic Campaign Plan* to set new requirements for Homeland Operations. The Army will conduct Homeland Operations within Constitutional parameters, which will assure maintenance of our free and democratic society. At the same time, the forces and capabilities provided by the Army today and in the future must be available for worldwide use in other missions. Therefore, the Army's role includes the conduct of Homeland Operations, provision of mandated Title 10, United States Code (USC), support to combatant commanders as they execute their assigned missions, preparation and support of Army National Guard forces for state (Title 32, USC) and federal service, and preparation of forces for other assignments. The Army must also transform for its future Homeland Operations roles in accordance with the vision of its senior leadership.

Historical Analysis and Lessons Learned

An analysis of studies and professional articles, to include lessons learned from wargames, seminars, and actual operations drove the need for certain aspects of this concept, to include historical perspective. In 1940, for example, the War Department began to analyze possible enemy attack scenarios and found that defense plans lacked depth. As a result, it developed the "Rainbow" plans, which changed the defense concept from a continental approach, where the enemy was met at the ocean's edge, to a hemispheric approach that would engage and defeat an enemy outside the Nation's immediate borders. To support this expanded defensive strategy, boundaries in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans set, in contemporary vernacular, an anti-access defense line. The concept derives its geographic approach and construct from that of the 1940s defense strategy of two defensive areas (described more fully later).

Both prior to and since 9/11, the Army has participated in and conducted exercises and wargames, which explored its role in Homeland Operations, both now and in the future. The 2002 Army Transformation Wargame for example, integrated homeland scenarios

into the overall global conflict. An insight from that game was that a clever adversary would probably try to prevent the US from responding overseas by attacking its force projection platforms within the US. Another insight was the competition for combat service and combat service support assets between Homeland Operations and the overseas activities. One conclusion was that that forces supporting Homeland Operations may need to rely more on commercial assets.

Lessons learned from Operation NOBLE EAGLE reveal that intelligence and information fusion is a significant seam in our military's ability to provide responsive support to the homeland. In the future, interagency, state, and local and military entities must continue to develop processes and procedures, especially the sharing of classified information, within legal guidelines, to enhance their ability to maintain situational understanding. Together, they must also strengthen processes for coordination and communication, from the establishment of liaison officers to the development and procurement of interoperable systems and sensors. Additional lessons learned from this operation and others include:

- 1 The importance of planning and coordination of training for use of force, working in the milieu of civilian publics, and sustainment of combat skills, such as marksmanship. The importance of training in the management of operations centers.

- 1 The importance of military bearing, appearance, and conduct when operating among US publics.

- 1 The criticality of continuous mission analysis, legal review, and use of the military decision making process.

- 1 Avoidance of changes to missions based on inadequate or false assumptions, misinterpreted intent, unrealistic development of implied tasks, or zeal in accommodating supported entities. This is sometimes called "mission creep." The goal should be deliberate, approved, appropriate, and validated mission changes in an environment of emergent activities, situations, and organizational participation.

- 1 The need for flexibility in determining military command and control (C2) arrangements to suit the situation and "battlespace" of the operation. The need for streamlined C2 to enable coordination.

- 1 The need for political leadership and decision-making based on sound advice from subject matter experts. The process needs to produce appropriate and prioritized support in as timely a manner as possible.

- 1 The need for good information management in terms of sources, conduits, and analysis. The importance of relevant information.

- 1 The importance of transitions, to include measures of effectiveness, in shifting from managing a crisis to managing consequences, for example, and in eventual return to civilian only operations.

- 1 The importance of anticipation of problems and solutions.

- 1 The need for common definitions of key terms, such as "coordination," between operational players in a fluid environment of emerging requirements.

- 1 Translation of conflict management and assistance techniques from peace and humanitarian assistance operations to Homeland Operations.

- 1 The need and value of virtual reach for knowledge and expertise.

1 The requirement for development of joint doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures for the use of Air Force and Army Air and Missile Defense units to protect high-profile civilian events, like the Winter Olympics and critical assets in the Nation's capitol from terrorist attacks.

The study of history and lessons learned from recent exercises reveal many enduring principles for Homeland Operations. These are a few that influenced specific needs addressed by this concept.

1 The global security paradox. The Army must think globally in order to effectively conduct operations at home. This is an aspect of the principles of war of the Offensive and Maneuver.

1 The prevalence of support operations. The majority of operations in the homeland will be in support of civil authorities and our preparation must correlate with that purpose. This is an aspect of the principle of war of the Objective, relates to the principle of war of Mass and will involve unity of effort as discussed in the principle of war of Unity of Command.

1 The importance of space. Despite the prevalence of support to civil authorities, especially for the RC, Army air and missile defense efforts will be critical to the defense of the homeland. This is an aspect of the principle of war of Security.

1 The impacts and urgency of threats, attacks, significant disasters, and catastrophes in the homeland. These types of events may exceed the capability of civil authorities to respond. The Army must be able to provide surge capability in such circumstances. This is an aspect of the principle of war of the Objective, and relates to the principles of Mass, Security, Maneuver, and the Offensive.

1 The synergism of support, defense of the homeland, and warfighting capabilities. The Army's responsiveness, C2 capabilities, organization, and resources needed to fight wars make it capable of executing a wide range of Homeland Operations, including defense against air, cyber, and missile threats. Warfighting and Homeland Operation enhancements should be synergistic. This is an aspect of the principle of war of Economy of Force.

A secure homeland is a national priority. It is fundamental to the successful execution of the *National Security Strategy*, which together with the new *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, takes precedence over all other national strategies, programs, and plans. It is also essential to America's *National Defense Strategy* and the Nation's ability to project power and to honor its global security commitments. When directed, the Armed Forces of the United States will be able to prevent and protect against threats at their source overseas or within the homeland. They will also respond to help mitigate the consequences of natural or accidental disasters or attacks against the homeland in the earliest stages. The Armed Forces are an essential element of an integrated national security posture.

Just as the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* seeks to leverage the Nation's unique strengths in the areas of law, science and technology, information sharing and systems, and international cooperation, the Army must examine and develop its capabilities in these areas. It must, for example, participate in reviewing statutes and

regulations relating to quarantine and Posse Comitatus. It must ensure its capability to support, and if necessary, provide C2 of a joint force when conducting Homeland Operations. It must improve its information superiority, intelligence, and seamless C2 with other federal, state and local entities. It must design, in partnership with industry and the research and development community, better life support systems for its soldiers. It must continue to participate in international programs that facilitate overseas deployments and non-proliferation activities.

Homeland Operations Environment.

Homeland Operations primarily take place in all land, air, and sea territories of the US and includes space operations. This area encompasses the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the Caribbean and western Pacific possessions and territories. As such, the Areas of Responsibility of multiple combatant commands are involved within this geographical area. Additionally, federal, state, and local government agencies constitute a robust and diverse interagency milieu, which has distinct legal and functional jurisdictions. The US Army operates as a partner in this interagency and multi-jurisdictional environment.

The US Army must be prepared to defend and support the US population and territory and the American way of life. This is also its Constitutional requirement and history. The homeland has not always been secure, and military support was necessary to protect civilians. In Pennsylvania in 1794, for example, President Washington employed the militia, the volunteer force that later became the National Guard, in a show of force to suppress the insurrection known as the Whiskey Rebellion. During the War of 1812, the Army defended the nation against invasion. In 1916 it secured the southern border against bandit raids. In 1919 it supported quarantine operations in response to the Flu pandemic in the US. During the Second World War it defeated the enemy occupying U.S. territory in the Aleutian Islands. As recently as the early 1990s, all three components of the Army deployed to Los Angeles to protect the population from rioters.

These actions are part of Army full spectrum operations. Support of civil authorities is a core Army competency listed in FM 1, *The Army*. The Army also conducts these operations under civilian control, in most cases a lead federal agency (LFA). This is in accordance with the fundamental tenet of its professional ethos--subordination to civilian authority. Also, the Army will generally conduct Homeland Operations only when tasked after civilian authorities request such support from DOD. This may be in response to natural or man-made disasters.

Under extraordinary circumstances and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, the Army may conduct combat operations within the homeland to prevent, deter, preempt, and defeat an adversary's threat or attack. The Army can be proactive in its warfighting operations – when the military has the lead. However, the vast majority of Homeland Operations for the Army, with its unique “all-hazards” capabilities, will be civil agency support and augmentation. The Army has significant or unique resources that may support response to a major disaster or emergency, to include threats or use of weapons of mass effects (WME), chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-

yield explosive (CBRNE) attacks, or the effects of flooding, hurricanes, earthquakes, industrial accidents and the like. The Army provides response resources when needed, but this support will normally be temporary until a civil entity can function without help.

Federal civilian agencies are generally the primary agents for the coordination and employment of US government support. With the exception of protecting the nation from missile, air, naval, and ground assault, and the protection of military facilities and installations, the military will play a supporting role. DOD will be guided by civilian law and led by the principle that the federal government assists state agencies, except in terrorism and other incidents where the federal government has primary jurisdiction. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, restricts the circumstances under which military personnel may be used for civilian law-enforcement activities. When supporting state and local authorities, DOD usually does so through other federal agencies according to established agreements and plans and will not compete with the civilian or commercial sector. Its support will be coherent with all the capabilities of the joint community during joint operations, and interagency cooperation will be critical to success.

Homeland Operations may modify some warfighting processes and expectations. Intelligence is an example. The conduct of operations in a major combat operation (MCO), smaller-scale contingencies (SSC), or peacetime military engagement (PME) foreign-based contingency will be different from similar operations conducted in the homeland. In a foreign-based contingency, the Army receives detailed intelligence from national and theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. In Homeland Operations, the Army may receive some indications and warnings of a hostile threat or act from the national or theater level. However, events and actions will transpire quickly at the local level. Thus, the Army must also rely on local entities for detailed situational understanding. Within legal boundaries, it must integrate a coordinated ISR collection architecture and national intelligence agency analysis effort with all appropriate civil and law enforcement agencies the Army has also relied on AC forces for deployment and early employment in overseas conflicts, with RC forces, including the Army National Guard (ARNG), providing follow-on forces. Within the homeland, these roles may reverse as state authorities call on local guardsmen for initial support with the AC providing follow-on forces. The latter could be in support or under the operational control of the RC force commander.

Threats, Hazards, and Characteristics of the Environment.

Operational Context. It is possible that the Army may have to contend with every possible natural or man-made catastrophe, disaster, or dilemma known to humanity as it conducts Homeland Operations. Conventional attacks on the homeland are also a possibility and, as a minimum, the Army must remain prepared to continue to perform its conventional warfighting roles and functions within this COE. Moreover, our adversaries are watching, learning, and adapting. They will seek to marginalize the strength of our strategies and wait us out. In so doing they can accept not losing as an end state. They are modernizing. They will change from conventional operations when threatened and pursue an asymmetric strategy. They can also counter our capabilities with sufficient mass and technology to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses. They will seek to

defy our world leadership and economic viability. The presence and involvement of numerous agencies from all jurisdictions and the nongovernmental sector will challenge C2 and coordination.

Terrorism. Not the least of the threats to be faced are attacks against the Nation, to include the use of terrorism. Especially ominous are cooperative endeavors between adversaries who employ terrorism, insurgency, and crime to pursue their objectives. This will complicate efforts to defeat them singularly and in detail. The dedication of fearless fanatics further complicates these threats, as does the possibility of state-sponsorship, availability of CBRNE or WME (including the proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles), and sanctuary in stateless, underdeveloped regions of the world. *The National Strategy for Homeland Security* also describes several important characteristics of terrorism. Among these are the following:

- 1 Terrorists will pick targets based on their symbolic value and weaknesses they find in our defenses and preparations. These perceived weaknesses include our open and democratic society, which allows freedom of movement and association, and our free market system, which can be exploited for financial support or attacked for its strength and vigor. Our open, welcoming, pluralistic, diverse society and the value we place on individual lives, also presents vulnerabilities. Our worldwide engagement opens us to attack beyond our shores. Finally, the security from external threat, which we have enjoyed in the past by virtue of two vast oceans, must now be bolstered by some greater measure of internal "distance."

- 1 Terrorists may use a wide array of possible ways and means to attack the US, from CBRNE or WME, including offensive information operations and cyber attack, to conventional means, or as we have learned recently, by using our own assets against us.

- 1 Given the importance of centers of gravity to military operations in the past and indeed, in recently conceived operating concepts, the challenge to the US military will be to identify such centers. Absent doing so, it may need to develop entirely new ways to confront terrorism, ways perhaps not yet envisioned. Terrorist use of small nodes and cells rather than hubs and spokes could complicate our efforts.

- 1 As part of an asymmetric approach to war, surprise is key to terrorist actions. We frequently do not know the identity and location of non-state terrorist organizations or terrorist intent. The ability of terrorists to infiltrate and move freely hampers detection and promotes surprise.

- 1 Opportunistic terrorists exploit vulnerabilities, choosing the time, place, and method of attack.

- 1 Other "hazards" and conditions. Natural disasters such as tornadoes and tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, drought, wildfires, and human and animal epidemics, as well as man-made or man-related disasters such as transportation and industrial accidents, may call for Army support within the homeland. Similarly, existing laws permit postal augmentation, certain types of support to law enforcement not involving terrorists, and military assistance to civil disturbances.

Characteristics of the COE. Each of the threats, "hazards," and conditions may have some or all of the following characteristics:

- 1 Concentration of unfamiliar effects such as CBRNE or WME leading to bewilderment.
- 1 Misinformation and disinformation.
- 1 Panic, fear, and possible chaos, although research indicates that these would occur only in limited circumstances.
- 1 Tenuous public security and lack of law and order.
- 1 Significant, or in some cases, even catastrophic environmental and infrastructure damage to include Vital human services, Civil administration, Communications and information, Transportation and distribution, Energy, Food, Commerce, and Industrial.

Implications. The COE highlights a wider spectrum of operations, increased unpredictability, and a more complex range of operating conditions. It dictates new ways to think and operate and presents a force design and training dilemma across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army must be capable of preventing, protecting against, or effectively responding to attacks by conventional and unconventional forces, terrorists, criminal organizations and other threats. It must also be capable of dealing with "all hazards." Army leaders will require an unparalleled degree of situational understanding and planning for a wide range of tasks. It must be ready, for example, to use its high-density organizations for such manpower intensive tasks as infrastructure protection. It must also be ready to use low-density organizations, such as medical or behavioral health teams that deal with stress, for events that create unusual effects. It must also be able to generate additional resources for all these functions.

Constraints and Limitations.

The operational construct is designed for the security of the homeland. Certain aspects of this concept may not apply to global operations given the unique operational environment within the US, its territories, and possessions.

The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, service regulations, and policies prohibit the use of federal military forces from performing civil law enforcement functions unless permitted by an Act of Congress or the Constitution. The Smith Mundt Act of 1947 prohibits psychological operations against US citizens. Army Regulation (AR) 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, circumscribes certain intelligence activities in the civil sector.

Civil Support Operations: All requests from civil authorities for support are evaluated by DOD approval authorities against the following criteria:

- 1 Legality (compliance with laws).
- 1 Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces).
- 1 Risk (safety of DOD forces).
- 1 Cost (who pays, impact on DOD budget)

- 1 Appropriateness (whether the requested mission is proper and fitting for military participation).
- 1 Readiness (impact on ability to perform other missions).
- 1 Current laws and/or policies governing DOD intelligence collection and sharing of interagency information.
- 1 Current statutes governing DOD domestic offensive information operations.

With the exception of support to counterdrug operations, the standing rules of engagement for US forces, as delineated by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01 A, do not apply in civil support operations. The DOD Civil Disturbance Plan, also known as Garden Plot, contains guidelines for forces in civil disturbance situations. Forces deployed to support civil authorities for disaster situations follow use-of-force guidelines as set forth in the mission's execute and subsequent orders.

Concept

Framework. Homeland Operations consist of those legally sanctioned military measures to prevent, protect, and respond to all-hazards threats against the US, its territories and possessions, which endanger its people, resources, facilities, and critical infrastructure. The Army will participate in the following ways:

- 1 **Prevent** an adversary from attacking the homeland. Prevention is a primary goal of in Homeland Operations. Prevention includes the ability to deter, preclude, or preempt adversaries in a proactive manner. The Army's contribution to the joint force capability to rapidly and decisively defeat an adversary may deter outright aggression. If deterrence fails, Army forces in a joint force may rapidly deploy to gain a positional advantage that causes an adversary to "re-think" their original intentions or preclude them from continuing with their mission. Finally, Army forces in a joint force may move preemptively to destroy enemy threats before they are able to attack the homeland. Preemption may also include offensive information operations or actions to mitigate or prevent disasters such as engineer dams or levees.

- 1 **Protect** against attacks on the homeland. The US will endeavor to prevent all threats to the Homeland. However, it must be prepared to defend against expected and surprise attacks, both physical and cyber. Protection includes measures to detect, interdict, and defeat threats, preferably before they reach the homeland. Air and missile defense, defense of US sovereignty, and critical infrastructure and key asset protection are aspects of protection.

- 1 **Respond** to support civil authorities. Upon request, DOD Army responds to support civil authorities in natural, man-made, non-hostile, and hostile disasters, in many cases primarily with Army forces. These disasters may emanate from natural causes such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes or man-made causes such as civil disorder, industrial accidents, and mass immigration. Hostile disasters may include CBRNE or WME. In all cases, The Army may provide support to save lives, prevent property damage, and reduce suffering until civil authorities are able to restore control.

Such operations place a premium on Army surge capabilities in order to mitigate effects and may involve immediate response under certain circumstances. Preparedness will be key enabler of response.

These operations involve coordination and synchronization of active and passive measures between federal (to include DOD), state, and local governments and agencies to protect the US. Homeland Operations bring together traditional and emerging national security requirements, with an emphasis on a proactive approach to threats and hazards. These operations may be globally focused, but only as they pertain to direct threats against the homeland. The majority of operations are conducted in the homeland. Nevertheless, Army forces must be prepared to respond rapidly and decisively beyond the borders of the homeland as part, or even as an Army force (ARFOR) headquarters, functional land component, or joint task force (JTF) headquarters of a joint force.

When directed, the Army will participate to preempt adversaries that directly threaten our homeland before they have an opportunity to attack us, as we look globally to defeat hostile actors at their source. Army forces must be capable of defeating adversaries within the homeland and of providing support to civilian authorities in a variety of ways, even while defeating adversaries outside our borders. A transformed Army will have enhanced capabilities to conduct these operations more quickly, efficiently, and with reduced casualties and collateral damage.

Roles


The Army conducts Homeland Operations as part of a DOD effort that will be in a lead or support role. In a lead role, DOD would have primary responsibility for an operation. In a support role it would aid, protect or support another agency. DOD may also perform both roles simultaneously.

1 Lead. Under extraordinary circumstances, the military may be directed to defend, and if necessary, engage to defeat the efforts of an adversary within the homeland. The Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense System (GBMCDS), formerly called National Missile Defense, is an example of an Army system used in this role. Other DOD lead roles include the defense of the Nation's airspace and maritime approaches and some intelligence operations.

1 Support. DOD provides support to federal, state, and local agencies in circumstances that are or could be catastrophic in nature, such as mitigating the effects of an attack or disaster. This category also includes support missions that are routine and limited in scope, such as support to National Security Special Events (NSSE).

Operational Construct

Military planners in 1940 developed their hemispheric strategy to provide both depth and an anti-access component to defense of the homeland, as well as to facilitate offensive operations. Today the US military must be able to prevent, protect, and respond to threats and hazards in two spatial and geographic zones: the land, air, and sea of the Homeland Zone, and the land, air, sea, and space of the Forward Zone. These zones may overlap or change depending on the situation. The Homeland and Forward Zones include some aspects of the global information environment with their own characteristics, and the US will conduct fluid operations in the associated cyberspace. Conceptually the zones display an area in



which the military and other agencies conduct integrated operations to prevent, protect, and respond to threats and hazards to ensure a secure homeland. This operational concept is proactive, appropriately focused for internal and external threats, and conducted in depth by layering military and interagency capabilities, beginning at the source of the threat. The availability of resources from other federal, state, and local agencies at and within the Nation's borders highlights the importance of interagency interoperability. In each zone the Army must also be capable of rapidly deploying to conduct coherent joint operations, when required, while leveraging focused logistics, trained and ready soldiers and units, and current and future sustainability and survivability. As required, the Army will participate in the national effort to control and defend land, people, infrastructure, and natural resources in each zone.

Homeland Zone. The Homeland Zone consists of all states, territories, and possessions, and surrounding water generally out to 500 nautical miles. The Homeland Zone is the inner ring within which a comprehensive land, maritime, and aerospace strategy protects the homeland. In conflict, the Army, normally as part of a joint force, may be called upon to defeat an adversary in this zone while simultaneously conducting operations to defeat the source of the threat in the Forward Zone, including space. The Army's roles in response to crises in the Homeland Zone may include: joint and interagency operations, defensive operations, support to law enforcement, disaster relief, civil disturbance, counterdrug operations, force protection of deploying forces, infrastructure assurance, air defense, and other civil support. As charged in various plans, statutes, and directives, the Army will help defend the industrial base, provide engineering and transportation support, treat and evacuate casualties, manage the consequences of WME and CBRNE, and support and reinforce civil authorities. Army forces in this zone will include but are not limited to special purpose forces such as explosive ordnance (EOD) disposal, medical, or engineer units. These forces may have small support packages and reduced sustainment demands.

While DOD is lead in this zone, the Army will use its warfighting skills and capabilities not found in the civil and private sectors. The best efforts of all levels of government may be unable to prevent hostile actions against the Nation. If required, the Army's strategic and operational role must be to defend the homeland against attacks and interdict or destroy all threats. This will normally be a joint operation in conjunction with civil authorities. However, attacks against the homeland by the military forces of a nation-state will be met by the Armed Forces of the United States in a lead role.

Homeland Zone

All US states, territories and possessions.

Task: Interdict and destroy threats against the homeland

Purpose: Protect citizens, environment, and infrastructure

While DOD is in support in this zone, the Army will also strategically and operationally use its organic assets designed for the warfight and provide selected capabilities for use. These may be as support to a civil lead or a cooperative effort between military and civil leads. Certain statutes, directives, and plans also require support. The Army is capable of providing a wide scope of such support. For example, the Army provides support to the 12 emergency support functions contained in the FRP. The Army may be required to mitigate the effects of a hostile or non-hostile generated disaster, to save lives and reduce suffering, or to maintain and restore law and order. It may do so with state National Guard forces as the first military responders. Support may also be routine and limited in scope, such as counterdrug, NSSE and surge requirements for civil security requirements, such as at airports or at borders. The Army will routinely conduct support operations within an interagency and sometimes joint framework.

Homeland Zone

Task: Support CBRNE and WME Consequence Management

Purpose: Mitigate effects of a CBRNE or WME disaster

Task: Support Civil Law Enforcement

Purpose: Maintain or Restore Law & Order

Task: Conduct Relief Operations

Purpose: Save lives and reduce suffering

Forward Zone. The Forward Zone consists of the remaining land, air, space and sea areas not included in the Homeland Zone. DOD precludes and defeats threats to the homeland in this zone. When actionable intelligence is received, the US may move to preempt by defeating the threat at the source.

The Army's role in this zone, under DOD's aegis, is to prevent threats to the homeland as far forward as possible. The Army can help reduce arms races, counter the proliferation of CBRNE or WME, combat terrorism, and deter aggression. The Army, as part of a joint force, can also conduct limited preemptive operations. These are designed to defeat imminent threats against the homeland, but are not categorized as SSCs or MCOs. They are not campaigns, but are quick and limited offensive strikes designed to interdict or destroy adversaries who attempt to take advantage of air, space, sea, and land approaches to infiltrate our territory. Successful operations in the Forward Zone will require the Army to be able to develop accurate and timely intelligence as part of a joint, interagency, and multinational team. Preemptive operations will require Army forces that have tactical maneuverability, precision munitions, and information superiority. During some preemptive operations, forward deployed maneuver support units, including air and missile defense units, may be employed to support strike operations. This includes the GBMCDS.

Forward Zone

All air, sear, land, and space areas of the world outside the Homeland Zone.

Task: Defeat imminent threats against the homeland through limited preemptive operations

Purpose: Prevent attacks against the homeland zone

The Army must be tied into national intelligence collection and analyses networks and provide ARSOF to rapidly counter threats. These protective actions may take place in a joint and multinational operation.

Quality of Firsts. A new paradigm of how Army units will achieve mission success across the spectrum of military operations, based on leap-ahead capabilities enabled by advanced technologies, these describe how these units will see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively at the tactical level.

In tactical Homeland Operations involving DOD as the lead, the Army will:

See / Understand First to:

- Develop the situation out of physical contact
- Identify threats
- Determine enemy intent
- Determine methods of operation/organization (order of battle)
- Identify networks and linkages (transnational terror)
- Identify centers of gravity

Act First to:

- Achieve positional advantage
- Preclude adversaries ability to achieve their objectives

- Disrupt command, control, computers, and communications
 - Reduce enemy freedom of action
 - Fix, contain, isolate forces
 - Deny sanctuary/force out of sanctuary
 - Conduct multidimensional operations
 - Maneuver fires / fires / non-kinetic / psychological
 - Create broad range of options
 - Increase complexity on enemy
 - Force enemy to react / adapt to our operations
 - Apprehend
- Finish decisively by:
- Destroying, disorganizing, disintegrating adversaries
 - Denying adversary objectives

In tactical operations involving DOD in support, the Army will:

See / Understand First to:

- Assist preparedness
- Develop the situation
- Anticipate required support to the lead
- Identify required support from the lead
- Identify capabilities
- Integrate with interagency and multi-jurisdictional partners

Act First to:

- Save lives, protect property, and reduce suffering
- Mitigate the consequences of a disaster
- Reassure the public
- Reduce further damage/disorder
- Restore/maintain critical infrastructure
- Provide surge capability to civil agencies
- Preclude adversaries ability to achieve objective

Finish decisively by:

- Restoring control to civil authorities
- Denying enemy objectives

Characteristics of the Force

Design Parameters. The Army is optimized for warfighting and will generally not create force structure solely for Homeland Operations. However, Army units must be prepared to defend and support US citizens and territory as well as be available for worldwide use in other missions. Therefore, Army units must be capable of being tailored for Homeland Operations. Units may also rotate into higher states of readiness for Homeland Operations through more intensive training, alert status, use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment, or equipment modification. This will require

a unit design capable of providing support to multi-jurisdictional, federal, state, and local governments. This design must also afford availability of the unit for worldwide deployment to engage in full spectrum operations. To conduct Homeland Operations Army units should be designed with the following parameters:

- 1 Capable of Being Tailored for Homeland Operation Support Roles. Response will often be to augment the capabilities of civil authorities as they respond to disasters.

- 1 Modular. Units must have a standardized structure with the ability to quickly task organize with multifunctional soldiers to provide the flexibility required in supporting Homeland Operations.

- 1 Function-Based. The Army will need forces capable of being tailored to facilitate function-based task organization. Using the principal of modular design, units can be rapidly organized for function-based tasks.

- 1 Wide Span of Control. Homeland Operations will often be characterized by support spanning a sizeable geographical area and involving many state, local, and federal agencies with distinct legal and functional jurisdictions.

- 1 Threshold Capabilities. Units must rapidly execute the full range of Homeland Operations with the right forces at the right time.

- 1 Civil Integration. A key characteristic of most Homeland Operations will be the military in support of a LFA, which is supporting a state or local government. Responding military forces must be trained in civil procedures and have the ability to operate within the civil C2 or incident command structure as it mitigates the consequences of an attack or disaster.

- 1 Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS). The use of COTS equipment and technology by military forces supporting Homeland Operations allows greater interoperability with other federal, state, and local agencies, improving effectiveness and efficiency of responding forces. This will reduce the logistics footprint and replenishment requirements of responding forces by allowing the use of contracted civil assets for support and sustainment.

Required Capabilities. The Army must be able to responsively deploy the required capabilities within any zone to help prevent, protect against, or respond to threats or hazards. While in a supporting role in the homeland zone, the determination of required capabilities is weighted against the shortfalls of Civil or other agency capabilities in relation to the hazard effects, as depicted in the Homeland Operations equation.

The following capabilities must be available to the Army as it conducts Homeland Operations:



The diagram is a yellow rectangular box with a black border. Inside, the text is as follows: At the top, 'Required Military Capabilities' is written in red, underlined. Below it, a red integral symbol \int is followed by 'x' in red, then '[All Hazard Effects – Civil Capabilities]' in black. A horizontal line follows. Below the line, the word 'Drivers' is in black, followed by '(FRP, DODD, etc)' in a smaller black font.

The Homeland Operations Equation

1 Interagency Coordination, Integration, and Communication. The integration of military forces, often in support of another federal agency, must be as transparent to the supported state or local government as equipment, training, and resources will allow.

1 Detection and Mitigation Support. Army forces must have the ability to task organize function based units that can immediately identify CBRNE agents or substances, assess current and projected consequences, advise on response measures, and provide support validated by proper authorities.

1 Intelligence and Information Fusion. Intelligence and information systems must be designed to provide nearly instantaneous intelligence and information from the strategic, operational, tactical and local levels.

1 Engineering. Response to disasters frequently involves the requirement for the full range of engineer support, such as construction of emergency facilities, acquisition of real estate, geospatial engineering, emergency debris removal, and many other typical engineer activities.

1 Logistics Coordination, Distribution and Medical Support. Homeland Operations should have a minimal logistical footprint, while ensuring sufficient and efficient support. Contract logistical support, such as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program will assure the agility of warfighting forces to respond to Homeland Operations and worldwide missions.

1 Lethal and Non-Lethal capabilities. Homeland Operations will require the ability to project scalable non-lethal capabilities. All units must be proficient in the application of force, whether it's lethal or non-lethal.

1 Civil Augmentation Resources. The Army must have rapidly deployable resources and trained soldiers to provide a temporary surge capability to civil authorities when they have exhausted their assets.

1 Search and Rescue. The capability inherent in Army units to provide search and rescue to soldiers in a combat zone is one often required by civil authorities to rescue civilians during disasters such as floods or building collapses. Army units are not designed for the more technical aspects of search and rescue in destroyed buildings such as the World Trade Center. However, they must be capable of providing manpower for debris removal while searching for buried people or operating aircraft and sensors that would assist in retrieving lost or stranded civilians. Military working dogs have been used in the past to assist these efforts and will likely be required in the future.

1 Security. Historically, the Army has provided security force augmentation to civil authorities during civil disturbances; special events, such as Olympic event disasters, and during times when mission loads far exceed the capacity of civilian law enforcement agencies, such as airport security augmentation. The Army must remain capable of providing these types of capabilities.

1 Automated Language Translation. Homeland Operations will require Automated Language Translation including text-to-text, text-to-voice, voice-to-text, and voice-to-voice translations for manned and unmanned systems.

1 Sensors, Sensor Fusion, and Networking. Homeland Operations will require an ISR architecture that ensures unity of purpose for all sensors. Human and technical, manned and unmanned, terrestrial and space-based capabilities will be needed to sense the operational environment and detect, identify and track threats.

1 Offensive and Defensive Information Operations. Homeland Operations will require the Army to both leverage existing and emergent full-spectrum IO capabilities. Commanders will conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) IO to apply the information element of combat power.

1 Integrated Air and Missile Defense. In meeting the threat to the homeland, the Army must be able to participate in an integrated, joint force that will detect and destroy enemy cruise and ballistic missile systems. Space and Missile Defense Systems must be thoroughly integrated, both vertically and horizontally, to provide a single, layered missile defense system.

1 Counterdrug Operations. When directed to do so, the Army must have access to capabilities to detect and monitor suspected drug traffickers. It must assure that tactics, techniques and procedures for planning and conducting counterdrug interdiction and eradication missions in military support to law enforcement remain up-to-date and relevant.

1 Precision munitions. These munitions are needed to minimize collateral damage while retaining the ability to destroy the desired target. They will also reduce logistical requirements.

1 Mobile, responsive, deployable units. To assure timely availability of forces, they must be highly mobile, deployable, and ready to fight in locations throughout the world including the homeland.

1 Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP). As a presentation of timely, fused, accurate, assured, and relevant information, the CROP must be tailored to meet the requirements of forces involved in Homeland Operations.

1 Unmanned/Riverine/Underground Aerial Vehicles and Robotics. These must be available to provide surveillance, strike, or interdiction with minimal danger to US forces involved. Robotics will prove essential as an alternative to risking human life during CBRNE reconnaissance and detection, thermobarics and EOD operations.

Enhanced Digital Terrain Enhanced Data System. This type of terrain information will help make Army forces more capable of analyzing terrain in order to conduct operations as well as making terrain data accessible faster and in more detail.

The Objective Force in Homeland Operations

The Objective Force. The Objective Force (OF) is the force that achieves Army transformation and could be used in Homeland Operations. It is a future force – a common design applied to the entire Army that builds a force, which is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable as described earlier and in *The Army Vision*. The OF will be able to dominate in any operation and transition quickly to different missions without losing momentum.

Unit of Purpose Framework. The OF employs a Unit of Purpose framework to help the Army examine its organizations, tasks, purposes, C2, and mission tailoring for Homeland Operations. At present, the framework establishes two basic organizations — the Unit of Employment (UE) and the Unit of Action (UA).

1 Unit of Employment. The OF UE is a versatile, multidimensional organization that can perform numerous roles and functions. It gives the President, Secretary of Defense, and joint force commander (JFC) a broad set of options for use in all phases and across the full spectrum of operations. The UE's organization and design will make it capable of such C2 functions as an ARFOR, functional component command, or JTF. The UE can synchronize operations of federal, state, local and nongovernmental entities. The general-purpose quality of this force ensures its long-term relevance to adaptive, sophisticated threats and the frequently changing requirements of the COE, including disasters. The UE will be able to conduct simultaneous operations synchronized with other forces in a distributed, non-linear homeland environment. The UE can rapidly deploy or augment for immediate response where the Army may be *lead* or *support*. It can become a larger organization through contingency mission tailoring. In the past, UE were field armies, corps and divisions.

1 Unit of Action. UA are the tactical echelons of the OF. For analytic purposes the UA comprises those echelons brigade and below. Maneuver UAs are the smallest combined arms units that can operate independently. Sub-components of the UA may operate in the homeland for specific, specialized functions where a brigade-sized unit is unnecessary or impractical. For continued developmental purposes, the core of the UA brigade is the combined arms combat battalion that commands a number of organic small tactical units, which may perform homeland operations as teams of teams. The span of control of the UA brigade is four to six battalions. Maneuver UAs will need durability, endurance and stamina. The UA can be augmented by the UE to meet full spectrum requirements. When needed, UA capabilities facilitate operational integration with civilian components of Homeland Operations.

Glossary

Section 1. Abbreviations

AC	Active Component
AR	Army Regulation
ARFOR	Army forces
ARNG	Army National Guard
C2	Command and Control
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives
COE	Contemporary Operational Environment
COTS	Commercial Off The Shelf
CROP	Common Relevant Operational Picture
CTC	Combat Training Center
CS	Combat Support; Civil Support
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities
FCS	Future Combat System
FM	Field Manual
FRP	Federal Response Plan
GBMCDS	Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense System
HLS	Homeland Security
HO	Homeland Operations
IO	Information Operations
IS	Information Superiority
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JTF	Joint Task Force
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
MACOM	Major Command

MCO	Major Combat Operation
OF	Objective Force
NSSE	National Security Special Events
O&O	Operational and Organizational
RC	Reserve Component
RDO	Rapid Decisive Operations
RISTA	Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
SSC	Smaller-scale contingencies
SOF	Special Operations Forces
UA	Unit of Action
UE	Unit of Employment
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WME	Weapons of Mass Effect

Section 2. Terms

Civil Support. Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Also called CS (JCS working definition).

Domestic Terrorism. Involves groups or individuals whose activities are directed at elements of our government or population without foreign direction.

Functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily composed of forces of two or more Military Departments, which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1 -02).

Force Protection. Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place. It coordinates and synchronizes offensive and defensive measures to enable the joint force to perform while reducing opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (FM 3-0).

Homeland Defense. The protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. Also called HLD (JCS working definition).

Homeland Operations. Homeland Operations consist of those measures to prevent, protect, and/or respond to all-hazard threats against the United States, its territories and

possessions, that endanger its people, resources, facilities, and critical infrastructure. It coordinates and synchronizes active and passive measures between federal (to include DOD), state, and local governments/agencies to protect the United States.

Homeland Security. The preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggression directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support. Also called HLS (JCS working definition).

International terrorism. Activities undertaken by or in support of terrorists or terrorist organizations that occur totally outside the United States, or that transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum. (DODD 5240.1-R).

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). Those DOD activities and measures covered under MSCA (natural and man-made disasters) plus DOD assistance for civil disturbances, counterdrug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. (DODD 3025.15).

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). Those activities and measures taken by DOD components to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparing for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. (DODD 3025.10).

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02).

Weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)

Weapons of mass effects. Chemical, nuclear, radiological, and biological weapons or electronic programs or devices or large conventional explosives that create significant or catastrophic effects on life, commerce, property or information and information systems, though they do not ensure destruction. Also called WME.